Introduction
Criminal cases in the post-Charter 1 era often call upon Canadian judges to make decisions about controversial social practices and identities that lie far afield of their own experience. Faced with decisions that bear upon largely unfamiliar realms of social life, courts have become increasingly open to making factual determinations on the basis of social science and other expert evidence. 2 The influx of expert evidence into the courtroom derives both from the increased adjudication of complex social issues under the Charter, and the expansion of relevant research from other disciplines. 3 It also reflects a trend towards interdisciplinarity in legal scholarship and practice. 4 As Christine Boyle and Marilyn MacCrimmon observe:
Historically, the discipline of law has jealously guarded its borders; insights of other disciplines have not readily been incorporated into legal discourse. However, insights from other disciplines can operate to facilitate open-minded fact determination.
Where expert evidence is provided in litigation, it can broaden the horizons of judicial knowledge, and thereby benefit marginalized social groups. 6 However, courts do not always receive the information they need in order to make informed conclusions about social facts. This paper looks at how courts in two recent criminal cases-R v JA 7 and R v NS 8 -proceed to determine issues that engage marginalized social interests when the expert evidence available is scant.
Jeremy Bentham famously stated: "The field of evidence is no other than the field of knowledge." 9 Two centuries later, Boyle and MacCrimmon note that in a society consciously committed to pluralism, the important question is "whose knowledge?" 10 In this paper, I use the term "legal worldview" to refer to the web of experiences and beliefs perpetuated by the common law, whether through legal precedent, convention, or judicial notice-often informally appealed to as "common sense." As argued by Geoffrey
Samuel, law as a system of knowledge is distinct from empirical disciplines in that "epistemological validity arises not from scientific inquiry but uniquely from authority." 11 Unlike science, law does not demand verification against an external social reality-it is a self-contained system. 12 Building on Samuel's conception of legal epistemology, I argue that the exposure of "common sense" legal norms to factual scrutiny works to disrupt the hegemony of legal worldviews and thereby recognize marginalized social perspectives and interests. 13 However, as seen in JA and NS, parties who seek to contest legal norms that exclude or misconstrue their experiences face an uphill battle.
6 Ibid at 62. 7 R v JA, 2008 ONCJ 195, [2008 OJ No 1583 [JA trial] . 8 R v NS, 2012 SCC 72, [2012 13 Citing Gramsci, Judith Halberstam powerfully illuminates the link between hegemony and the authoritative pronouncement of "common sense": "Accordingly hegemony, as Gramsci theorized it and as Hall interprets it, is the term for a multilayered system by which a dominant group achieves power not through coercion but through the production of an interlocking system of ideas which persuades people of the rightness of any given set of often contradictory ideas and perspectives. Common sense is the term Gramsci uses for this set of beliefs that are persuasive precisely because they do not present themselves as ideology or try to win consent." The Queer Art of Failure (Durham: Duke Univ Pr, 2011).
There are two challenges that arise for such litigants. The one most frequently identified is the need to supply adequate expert evidence with respect to the norm at issue. As equality-oriented scholars have noted, this can raise difficulties due both to gaps and biases in the available social science, 14 and to the resources required to engage experts in litigation. 15 This is a significant challenge, and in this paper, I
demonstrate that the burden of supplying expert evidence tends to fall on the party seeking to refute the legal norm, rather than the party seeking to rely on it. Where expert evidence is not provided, the courts simply revert back to established legal wisdom, upholding the status quo even while acknowledging the shaky empirical ground upon which it rests.
And yet the principal contribution of this piece is to argue that before the party seeking to contest a legal norm even contemplates the provision of expert evidence, they must first persuade the court to accept a reframing of that norm as a question of fact that is susceptible to proof. Only then will the court entertain evidence, expert or otherwise, with respect to that fact. In other words, the legal norm at issue must be "softened" into fact before the more recognized issue of expert evidence even arises. Thus, the fight to disrupt legal norms (and thereby legal worldviews) occurs in two stages: 1) reframing the norm as a question of fact; and 2) providing expert evidence to prove that fact. A failure at either stage allows the legal norm, and the broader worldview it expresses, to persist. Nevertheless, even if the second stage is not fulfilled, the softening of the norm's authority at the first stage via the exposure of factual uncertainty opens the door to change at a later date through the incorporation of new knowledge.
I begin by providing a brief overview of JA and NS, focusing on the factual issue for which expert evidence was found to be lacking in each case. I then examine the role of expert evidence in making issues of social difference legible to judges, and how that role has been influenced by the implementation of the Charter.
14 Joan Brockman, "Social Authority, Legal Discourse, and Women's Voices" (1991) 
The Cases

R v JA
The criminal charges against JA arose from a sexual encounter that took place within a tumultuous longterm relationship marked by both domestic violence and kinky sex. On the evening in question, JA strangled 16 his partner KD to heighten sexual pleasure-a practice known in the S/M context as erotic asphyxiation. KD lost consciousness as a result, at which point JA tied her up and began penetrating her anally with a dildo. The couple continued with other sexual activities after KD regained consciousness. KD reported the incident to the police a month and a half later, in the midst of arguments with JA over their son. She gave a videotaped statement stating that she did not consent to the encounter. However, at trial, she changed her position, affirming that the encounter was consensual and cooperating with the defense.
She was the sole witness in the case.
17
The Crown showed the videotaped statement in court but ultimately abandoned the motion to have it formally admitted into evidence. Instead, Crown counsel argued that KD could not legally consent to the bodily harm caused by the strangling. 18 He also took the position that KD could not legally provide advance consent to the sexual activities that took place while she was unconscious. The latter issue made its 16 The courts use the term "choking" rather than "strangling". However, the incident is more accurately described as strangling, as it involves external constriction of the neck that impedes both oxygen and blood flow to the brain. Choking occurs when there is an obstruction inside the throat that blocks the airway but not blood flow to the brain. Stephan Stapczynski, "Strangulation Injuries" (2010) 24 JA trial, supra note 7 at paras 23-25 (quotation at para 24).
defence argued that the risks associated with erotic asphyxiation were beyond common knowledge and required expert evidence, of which the Crown had presented none.
25
The trial judge agreed with the defence that she was "ill equipped" to assess the medical risks of erotic asphyxiation leading to unconsciousness, but nevertheless found that the practice constituted bodily harm on the basis that "the reasonable man would conclude that choking someone to the point of unconsciousness does interfere with that person's 'health or comfort' and can in some cases endanger life." 26 However, she found that the bodily harm in this case did not vitiate consent as it was only transient. 27 The Court of Appeal agreed with the accused that "it may have been preferable for the Crown to call expert evidence concerning this issue", but did not confirm whether the trial judge was entitled to find bodily harm without such evidence or not. 28 The Supreme Court of Canada did not address the issue of bodily harm, as the question was not put before them.
R v NS
NS was a complainant who alleged that her uncle and cousin had sexually assaulted her as a child. At the preliminary inquiry, the two accused sought an order to have NS remove her niqab-a face covering worn by some Muslim women in public places-while testifying, arguing that the ability to see her face was crucial to the accused's right to make full answer and defence. 29 issue. 30 The decision with respect to NS was remitted back to the preliminary inquiry judge.
The question of whether NS's right to religious freedom was triggered called for a case-specific inquiry as to the sincerity of her religious belief. 31 The engagement of the accused's fair trial rights, however, rested upon a broader factual proposition: that facial demeanour is an important tool for evaluating a witness, both in terms of the trier of fact's assessment of credibility and the defence's conduct of an effective crossexamination. 32 NS contested the validity of this claim.
33
The Superior Court judge found that if NS could demonstrate that she wore the niqab for religious reasons, she should then be allowed to testify wearing it, and it would be up to the preliminary inquiry judge to determine whether the resultant cross-examination was adequate based on his own observations. 34 The
Court of Appeal found that the relevance of demeanour to the assessment of credibility and crossexamination was a matter of judicial notice. 35 Not till the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada was the need for expert evidence on the issue even acknowledged. Lacking such evidence, both the majority and dissent nevertheless affirmed the value of facial demeanour as a tool for witness evaluation. 36 As in the JA trial decision, the Court was pressed to make a decision despite an acknowledged epistemic deficit.
Lived Social Difference
"The phenomenological -i.e., experiential -basis of equality is fundamentally a recognition that others experience the world differently from the way we do", observes Graham Mayeda. 37 Both JA and NS involve experiences of lived social difference that do not fall within the realm of traditional legal 30 NS Supreme Court, supra note 8. 31 The preliminary inquiry judge ordered NS to remove the niqab on the basis that her religious belief was open to exceptions and thus "not that strong" (supra note 29 at para 35). However, the upper courts rejected both the informal manner in which NS was questioned by the judge on this point, and the reasoning that led him to this conclusion. 32 In the context of the preliminary inquiry, the focus was on effective cross-examination (NS Superior Court, supra note 29 at para 109). However, the assessment of credibility was addressed in the case as an anticipated trial issue. 33 NS Superior Court, supra note 29 at para 48. 34 Ibid at paras 89-107. 35 R v NS, 2010 ONCA 670, [2010 there is no doubt that judges have often denied or misapprehended the experiences of women in abusive relationships (and that they continue to do so). Nevertheless, the courts arguably display even greater ignorance and prejudice with respect to the taboo subject of S/M. 41 Furthermore, as Karen Busby points out, the Canadian judiciary's lack of knowledge regarding S/M may actually contribute to its inability to properly recognize instances of abuse. 42 For these reasons, my focus is on the court's treatment of kinky sexuality as a marginalized and poorly understood social practice.
38 At the time JA was sentenced, he had three previous convictions for domestic violence, two of which were against KD. R v ONCJ 624, [2008 40 Johnson and Fraser observe that: "Over the last 30 years, social science research and the battered women's movement have been integral to the expansion of criminal justice responses to domestic violence which has included pro-arrest policies, no-drop prosecution polices, and specialized domestic violence courts." Ibid at 7. 41 In the few Canadian cases that raise the issue of S/M, medical or psychological (though not empirical) expert evidence has sometimes been presented, but almost always for diagnostic purposes-to determine whether a person exhibits pathological sexuality. However unlike battered women, who are pathologized as helpless and thereby afforded leniency under the law, kinksters are pathologized as deviant and violent in order to justify criminal punishment or the denial of rights to their children. Because the experiences at issue in JA and NS are unfamiliar to the common law and likely also to individual judges, in order to give them fair consideration judges must look to outside sources of knowledge. Expert evidence offers one (though not the only) means by which they may do so. 46 As Boyle and MacCrimmon observe: "Judges and lawyers are increasingly aware of the importance of taking social location into account. This awareness has lead to a scepticism about common sense assumptions and an openness to expert opinion to correct misperceptions about human behaviour." 47 Without such skepticism, judges risk the uncritical promulgation of norms derived either from their own life experience or from that 43 Khan, supra note 20 at 305. 44 The exclusion of Muslim women from the justice system is discussed by both the majority and the dissent at the Supreme Court of Canada, but only in the context of NS's right to religious freedom. It does not inform the analysis regarding the right to a fair trial. NS Supreme Court, supra note 8. 45 J LeBel's comments about how the niqab restricts acts of communication are telling in this regard. See NS Supreme Court, supra note 8 at para 77. 46 Of course, expert evidence may import its own biases and assumptions. As Brockman notes, "In suggesting that the law might benefit from the use of social science to correct underlying assumptions of fact, it is necessary not to lose sight of the fact that social science might also benefit from an examination of the assumptions of fact which permeate its work." (supra note 14 at 235) Moreover, it may be more empowering (though not necessarily more legally effective) for socially marginalized litigants to present evidence through their own direct testimony in certain circumstances. The key point for the purposes of this paper is that the presentation of evidence about key social issues, whether in the form of expert testimony or otherwise, helps to illuminate perspectives beyond the legal worldview. 47 Supra note 2 at 80. of proof, and on the part of whom) has significant substantive consequences, giving judges a great deal of room to maneouvre. 66 As will be seen in my analysis of JA, the same can be said for the parties, to the extent that they can influence the characterization of issues through argument.
In Constitutional Tipping Points, Suzanne Goldberg links the strategic construction of facts in litigation to the affirmation of marginalized social identities. 67 She argues that when American courts are called upon to make controversial decisions about the status of social groups, they resort to a strategy of "fact-based adjudication" which serves to obfuscate their normative choices. 68 While judges justify their conclusions in these cases on the basis of facts, Goldberg notes that empirical research alone cannot answer the legal questions at issue-the judges must still decide the correct inferences to be drawn from that information.
69
Taking JA as an example, the trial judge had to determine whether erotic asphyxiation to the point of unconsciousness met the definition of "bodily harm." Even if she had received the sought after expert evidence on the risks of the practice, she would still have had to make a normative judgment about what level of risk was acceptable. 
72
According to Goldberg's theory, judges look to facts as a safe ground for decision-making in times of normative uncertainty. However, the attention to facts is transitory, serving mainly as a catalyst for the transformation of legal norms: "Over time, in some cases, these fact-based decisions accrete and begin to reflect a coherent new view of a social group." 73 Consequently, "…by tracking and interrogating the way that courts reify the boundary between facts and norms, we can begin to demystify and critique the process by which courts absorb societal change." 74 Goldberg's analysis sheds light on how the characterization of the claims in JA and NS affects the law's capacity to affirm the perspectives and interests of the marginalized groups involved. Because the claims in JA and NS pertain to social framework, they lie mid-spectrum between law and fact and are thus especially susceptible to strategic construction.
JA
The contrasting arguments advanced by the Crown and defence in JA regarding the harm of erotic asphyxiation exemplify how different castings of the issue seek to achieve different goals. By focusing on the legal test for bodily harm and proposing an answer based on "common sense," the Crown frames the issue as a matter of law. In calling upon the court to denounce the "reckless behaviour" at issue, he encourages the court to take a normative stand and establish a precedent for future cases. Yet another possible framing of the erotic asphyxiation issue is altogether absent from the decision. Rather than focusing on the medical assessment of risk, a more equality-oriented inquiry might seek to understand the role and nature of erotic asphyxiation within S/M communities. Social science evidence in this regard would address two important issues: 1) whether the practice of erotic asphyxiation has "social value" and thus warrants an exception to the bodily harm rule according to Jobidon; 2) whether what occurred between JA and KD actually fits the description of erotic asphyxiation as it is commonly practiced within S/M communities.
The above inquiries might cast doubt on "common sense" (i.e. non-kinky) perspectives that might otherwise be perpetuated in law. For instance, in refutation of the Crown's argument that unconsciousness precludes sexual enjoyment, Khan notes that a queer view of time recognizes "the psychic satisfaction of imagining what will happen during future unconsciousness, and what did happen during past unconsciousness." 77 On the other hand, Busby questions whether the incident in JA meets widely followed community safety standards, noting that most S/M educators discourage erotic asphyxiation as too risky.
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Unfortunately, because the defence in JA does not pursue an explicitly equality-oriented strategy, these views are lost.
NS
While the factual inquiry in JA promises to correct judicial ignorance about an unfamiliar sexual practice, the claim in NS threatens to unsettle one of the criminal justice system's longstanding assumptions.
Because the value of facial demeanour as a tool for witness assessment already forms part of the legal status quo, when framed as a question of law it is uncontroverted. However, as Pinard observes, 77 Khan, supra note 20 at 258. Here, the Superior Court judge assumes that the New Zealand judge was competent to determine the impact of the burqa on the defence's capacity to evaluate the witness through his faculties of perception alone. 82 This reliance upon judicial experience reflects a legal framing of the issue; the judge's assessment is taken as authoritative, and the burqa's negative impact becomes a given, rather than a matter susceptible to proof.
The above passage demonstrates how characterizing the demeanour issue as a matter that the law can resolve internally via the application of judicial experience precludes meaningful consideration of lived 79 Postulats Necessaires, supra note 3 at 7. 80 NS Superior Court, supra note 29 at paras 78, 118, 121 and 143. 81 Ibid at para 131. 82 The Court of Appeal makes a similar assumption when it suggests that the inquiry into religious belief gives the judge an opportunity to evaluate how much the niqab will interfere with the judge's own credibility assessment (supra note 35 at para 76). However, the Supreme Court of Canada warns judges against making "over-confident predictions" in this regard (supra note 8 at para 44). validating NS's argument that "credibility assessments based on demeanour can be unreliable and flat-out wrong" and "can reflect cultural assumptions and biases." 85 At one point, the Court even goes so far as to suggest that permitting NS to wear the niqab might enhance the ability to evaluate her truthfulness, because she would be comfortable and therefore act more naturally. Were she to show her face, "[a] trier of fact could be misled by her demeanour. Her embarrassment and discomfort could be misinterpreted as uncertainty and unreliability." 86 Yet, this observation does not stop the Court from assuming the relevance of demeanour to both credibility assessment and effective cross-examination. 87 Indeed, the Court finds that these are matters of which judicial notice can be taken. 88 It justifies this seemingly contradictory result as follows:
The criminal justice system assumes that the truth is most likely to emerge through a public adversarial process. Face-to-face confrontation, especially between an accused and his accuser, is a feature of that adversarial process. cross-examiner cannot be dismissed because credibility assessments based on demeanour, like credibility assessments based on anything else, can prove to be wrong.
89
The Court's consideration of the issue on the basis of legal convention over empirical fact once again illustrates Pinard's point. One is left to wonder exactly how the truth will "emerge" from potentially erroneous assessments of credibility. Richard Lempert view is apt here when he argues that evidence law "…does not respond to the realities of the actual world, rather it responds to the supposed realities of a world it has established and modeled as if it were the actual world." 90 Lempert's point relates to Samuel's more general notion of law as a self-contained system. 91 The practical consequence of this epistemic insularity is the denial of NS's worldview.
Epistemic Deficits
In order to disrupt the legal status quo, the parties in JA and NS must first convince the relevant court that the issues at play ought to be treated as questions of fact. Legal scholars focused on the availability of expert evidence, or the capacity of resource-poor groups to provide it, have overlooked the importance of this first stage in the battle to dismantle exclusionary legal norms. Establishing the need for a factual assessment provides an opportunity for the introduction of expert evidence that may then cast doubt on the dominant legal perspective. If no factual inquiry is called for, then there is no place for the relevant evidence, whether or not it is available. By dismissing the need to look outside the law for answers, the Crown in JA and the lower courts in NS cut off the law's capacity to consider alternative perspectives, thwarting meaningful recognition of the marginalized interests at play. Of course, once the court does acknowledge a factual issue, empirical evidence must still be presented as a means of assessment. The
following section explores what happens after the trial judge in JA and the Supreme Court in NS accept the need for a factual approach, but find that the requisite evidence is lacking. I do agree however with defence that, without expert evidence, I am ill equipped in this case to decide the medical mechanism of unconsciousness, the degree of force required, the duration of force required to cause loss of consciousness, and likely injuries associated with choking, strangulation or unconsciousness. Defence also argues that I am not able to draw conclusions with respect to the degree of risk involved in this sexual practice, even if it consensual. It is my belief that the reasonable man would conclude that choking someone to the point of unconsciousness does interfere with that person's "health or comfort" and can in some cases endanger life. If this were a case of domestic assault and the accused had choked his partner and rendered her unconscious in a physical dispute, I have no doubt a conviction for bodily harm could ensue.
93
Despite her acknowledged lack of medical knowledge on the issue, the judge does not hesitate to exercise discretion with respect to the question at hand. One senses that her conclusion stems from little more than her own intuition, though the invocation of the classic figure of legal reasoning-"the reasonable man"-at least gestures at objectivity. The problem is that the case calls for interpretation of a scenario likely to be unfamiliar both to the judge personally, and to the average person as judicially imagined. Indeed, a similar problem occurs whenever the court confronts experiences of lived social difference-the very stuff of criminal and Charter litigation.
94
The judge attempts to dodge the novelty of the issue by appealing to how the law would treat the strangling if it took place within the more familiar context of domestic violence. While not surprising, this move is deeply problematic, in that the case effectively hinges on whether the incident in question is a manifestation of abuse or not. To assume that the domestic violence analogy is apt comes dangerously close to begging the question.
Some feminist scholars would disagree. Noting that the incident in JA took place within an abusive relationship and that strangulation is "one of the most lethal forms of domestic violence" 95 , Busby approves 92 Medical experts rarely testify in strangulation cases unless death occurs (Busby, supra note 16 at 341). 93 JA trial, supra note 7 at para 26. 94 Mayeda makes a similar point, noting that "the experience of most equality-seeking groups is not shared by the average juror" (supra note 2 at 208). 95 This much, however, can be said. The common law, supported by provisions of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and judicial pronouncements, proceeds on the basis that the ability to see a witness's face is an important feature of a fair trial. While not conclusive, in the absence of negating evidence this common law assumption cannot be disregarded lightly.
The point is similar to Lempert's contention about the self-referential nature evidence law. 110 What the above quotation highlights is the majority's inward looking approach in the absence of proferred expert evidence. When empirical research is not presented in the appropriate form, the majority reverts back to established legal wisdom, even as it admits that that wisdom rests on shaky empirical ground.
Even Abella J.'s powerful dissent does not dare break with the law's longstanding assumption about the importance of seeing a witness' face. For her, the question is not whether facial demeanour serves as a reliable tool for the assessment of truthfulness, but only whether the niqab's interference with that tool is significant enough to outweigh NS's right to religious freedom. 111 However, as acknowledged by the Court of Appeal, allowing NS to wear the niqab may not actually impede the assessment of credibility or crossexamination at all-it may have the opposite effect, by preventing misperceptions about demeanour that could result from NS's discomfort. 112 The empirical question is not only about how much assistance the observation of facial cues provides to the defence, but whether it provides any assistance at all. In the absence of expert evidence, the Court is united in relying on the longstanding assumption that it does.
Shifting Burdens
At this point, an objection might be leveled that courts have nowhere else to turn to but legal sources when faced with a shortage of expert evidence. In the face of factual uncertainty, the law calls for decision.
However, the distribution of burdens of proof determines who bears the cost of that uncertainty. According that what occurred between the couple met the standard of bodily harm. The Crown, however, fails to provide empirical evidence on this point, relying instead on arguments from "common sense". Despite the trial judge's acceptance that there is a valid factual issue to be determined via expert evidence, she does not ultimately impose that burden on the Crown. Instead, she agrees with the Crown's common sense approach.
In NS, the two accused seek an order for NS to remove her niqab on account of their fair trial rights. Given that they raised the issue, they ought to bear the burden of demonstrating that NS's refusal to show her face actually does impinge on the right. One might object that NS could just as easily be seen to have raised the issue by refusing to remove the niqab on religious grounds. Even allowing that the origin of the claim is unclear, surely the accused bear as much of a burden to show that the niqab violates their right to a fair trial as does NS to show that being forced to unveil violates her freedom of religion. Yet, in the absence of expert evidence, the Court assumes the validity of the link between facial demeanour and the right to a fair trial. It is up to NS to present evidence to rebut the legal norm, even when uncertainty regarding its factual underpinning is conceded.
A number of scholars focused on equality issues have expressed concern about the burden imposed upon marginalized groups to provide expert evidence in support of their legal claims. Mayeda notes that "accused from equality-seeking groups often lack the resources to gather the relevant research," assuming that the research exists at all. 114 Boyle & MacCrimmon make a similar point regarding the adjudication of Aboriginal rights: "Characterizing issues as factual and complex then placing the burden on Aboriginal peoples to establish these facts has affected their access to justice in several ways." 115 Of course, in JA there are important equality concerns on both sides of the issue, and neither JA nor NS is directly framed as an equality claim. Nevertheless, in each case, the burden of presenting expert evidence falls on the party seeking to make a marginalized perspective legally intelligible.
Measured Hope
In this paper, I have sought to demonstrate that challenging exclusionary legal norms is a double contest.
First, the norm must be successfully reframed as a question of fact. Second, the party seeking to challenge the norm must present expert evidence to support that fact. A failure at either stage causes courts to revert back to established legal wisdom, precluding the recognition of marginalized interests.
At first blush, this sounds like a story about judicial conservatism. The outcomes in JA and NS seem to reflect the courts' failure to incorporate new social perspectives. However, I would like to suggest a more hopeful reading, one that returns to Goldberg's theory of social change in American courts.
Recall Goldberg's thesis that when courts are called upon to make controversial decisions about shifting social norms, they rely on facts to ground their decisions. Goldberg offers a number of explanations for this behaviour, two of which are particularly relevant here. First, she notes that since facts are case-specific and subject to change, they allow for future flexibility in decision-making. 116 Thus, while characterizing an issue as factual may impose an onerous burdens of proof on a marginalized party and thereby prevent a successful claim in a given case, judges "ouvrent par le fait même la porte à d'autres contestations des mêmes dispositions mais à partir d'une preuve autre." 117 As the majority of the Supreme Court remarks in NS: "Future cases will doubtless raise other factors, and scientific exploration of the importance of seeing a witness's face to cross-examination and credibility assessment may enhance or diminish the force of the arguments made in this case."
118 Second, Goldberg argues that the courts' emphasis on facts corresponds with how people actually change their minds about social groups according to cognitive science: "fact-based adjudication is a byproduct of people's ability to absorb new factual information more quickly than they can reshape their underlying 116 Goldberg, supra note 67 at 49. 117 Pinard, supra note 3 at 54. 118 Supra note 8 at para 44.
conceptions to correspond to the new information." 119 According to this theory, the course of legal change mirrors the psychological mechanism of belief revision. Both proceed incrementally, through a process of destabilization and restabilization.
If we accept that courts are a human institution, the analogy is compelling. I have previously argued that "belief revision does not always work like an on-off light switch. Instead it can involve a tentative unsettling of a belief that will eventually lead to its dislodgement." 120 I used the analogy of a loose tooth that takes a bit of wiggling to come out. 121 In the same way, legal norms must first be loosened into questions of fact before they can be displaced. Even if the fact cannot be proven in a given instance, its very contestation invites further scrutiny from outside sources of knowledge, softening the law's bite, and perhaps, eventually, changing it altogether. 119 Goldberg, supra note 67 at 48. 
